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The utilization of heritage RS-25 engines, also known as the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), has 
enabled rapid progress in the development and certification of the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) 
toward operational flight status.  The RS-25 brings design maturity and extensive experience gained 
through 135 missions, 3000+ ground tests, and over 1 million seconds total accumulated hot-fire time.  
In addition, there were also 16 flight engines and 2 development engines remaining from the Space 
Shuttle program that could be leveraged to support the first four flights.  Beyond these initial SLS 
flights, NASA must have a renewed supply of RS-25 engines that must reflect program affordability 
imperatives as well as technical requirements imposed by the SLS Block-1B vehicle (i.e., 111% RPL 
power level, reduced service life).  Recognizing the long lead times needed for the fabrication, 
assembly and acceptance testing of flight engines, design activities are underway to improve system 
affordability and eliminate obsolescence concerns.  These key objectives are enabled largely by 
utilizing modern materials and fabrication technologies, but also by innovations in systems engineering 
and integration (SE&I) practices. 
1. Introduction 
With the first flight of the SLS vehicle approaching a reality in the 2019 timeframe, inaugurating flight status of the 
SLS architecture will invigorate mission planning for a number of flagship missions extending into the foreseeable 
future.  The current schedule of SLS missions will allow the existing supply of modified heritage RS-25 engines to 
last long enough to permit the development and certification of a new RS-25 design baseline that is more aligned 
with long-term SLS program objectives.  The design upgrade will preserve the recognized strengths of the proven 
SSME/RS-25 system in the areas of performance and reliability, and pursue additional enhancements of reduced 
production costs, fabrication times and operational requirements. 
1.1 SLS Overview 
NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) was initiated to replace the launch functionality of the Space Shuttle in terms 
of heavy-lift and crewed access to space.  In particular, SLS was envisioned as an “exploration class” capability to 
support mutiple human and robotic missions into deep space.  The SLS program is one of three collaborative NASA 
programs supporting crewed space exploration, the others being the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) 
program and the Ground Systems Development & Operations (GSDO) program.  All three programs are under the 
aegis of the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) organization and each program is responsible for key 
functional elements needed to enable “access to space” objectives.  The management of each program is 
disseminated across the three NASA centers responsible for space flight: SLS is managed at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center, MPCV is managed at the Johnson Space Center, and GSDO is the launch infrastructure managed at 
the Kennedy Space Center.  In order to insure effective integration of these programs into an operational enterprise, 
a high level of cross-program coordination and communication is required so that the decisions of one program does 
not unintentionally impact the others and the collective enterprise can evolve into an effective operational 
organization. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008958 2019-08-29T23:19:02+00:00Z
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Figure 1 shows how the SLS vehicle is planned to follow an evolution-based approach to achieve operational status 
followed by progressive upgrades.  The first SLS vehicle configuration is called the Block-1 and leverages modified 
RS-25 and solid rocket booster heritage hardware recovered from the Shuttle program to support a first flight goal in 
2019.  It will carry an uncrewed MPCV using an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) powered by a single 
RL10 engine.  The next SLS vehicle configuration is called the Block-1B and will provide support crewed and cargo 
missions in time for the second SLS launch in the 2021-2023 timeframe.  The Block-1B vehicle will be capable of 
performing crewed and cargo missions by replacing the ICPS with a higher-performing Exploration Upper Stage 
(EUS) using four RL10C-3 engines.  The Block-1B vehicle will eventually be supported by the addition of the 
Block-2 configuration, which will provide improved payload capability through the use of advanced boosters using 
solid or liquid propellants. 
 
Figure 1: SLS Vehicle Block Evolution 
In each vehicle configuration, the core stage will use four RS-25 engines, the first missions using modified Heritage 
RS-25s until they are expended, and eventually replaced by modern RS-25 engines developed specifically to support 
SLS missions.  These new engines will be developed to selectively trade reusability in exchange for affordability 
and improved performance. 
1.2 SSME Overview and Brief History 
The RS-25 is pump-fed staged-combustion rocket engine burning liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) 
to produce 2279 kN of vacuum thrust.  Primary components involve two low-pressure turbopumps feeding into two 
high-pressure turbopumps supplying propellants to the combustion devices, including two preburners, the main 
combustion chamber and nozzle.  The preburners are independently controlled to provide variable thust and mixture 
ratio.  In addition, the system was designed to be reusable, providing a certified service life of 55 starts and 27,000 
seconds.  The fuel-rich staged combustion cycle provides high performance, making it an attractive candidate in 
many vehicle trades for the SLS and prior conceptual vehicle studies.  Figure 2 shows an oblique view of the RS-25 
and major components with affordability objectives for cost reduction. 
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Development of the RS-25 (aka SSME) was started by Aerojet-Rocketdyne (AR), then the Rocketdyne division of 
Rockwell International, in 1972 and first flown on the STS-1 Space Shuttle mission in 1981.  The Space 
Transportation System (STS) shipset involved three RS-25s installed in the boat-tail of the orbiter.  During the STS 
program, AR operated 74 development engines and 83 flight engines to accomplish an extensive flight and test 
record.  Its history has been extensively documented[1], and the behavior of the engine system is thoroughly 
understood, repeatable, and predictable.  Its legacy is valued as a key contribution to the rapid development of the 
SLS system toward flight certification and operation. 
 
Figure 2: RS-25 Components (and cost reduction objectives) 
When the heritage SSMEs were recovered from the retired Space Shuttle program, they were effectively free flight-
certified hardware with exhaustive supporting documentation and experience backing them.  Care was taken to 
preserve that status as much as possible while modifying them for operational use on the SLS vehicle, and also 
establish a solid foundation to enable further improvements for follow-on engine production.  Figure 3 shows the 
planned evolution of  RS-25 design baselines, starting with the Heritage design baseline of the SSMEs recovered 
from the Shuttle program, then establishing the Adaptation design baseline through the incorporation of a new 
Engine Control System (ECS), an SLS-specific suite of Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) and Thermal 
Protection System (TPS) for the nozzle.  The Restart design baseline is planned to reduce the recurring and non-
recurring costs of the RS-25 by a third in order to provide long-term affordability and sustainability of propulsion 
elements for SLS. 
 
Figure 3: RS-25 Evolution from STS to SLS 
7TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE FOR AERONAUTICS AND SPACE SCIENCES (EUCASS) 
 
2. Next-Generation RS-25 
Understanding that with four engines expended per SLS mission, the current supply of sixteen Adaptation engines 
will be exhausted after four missions.  Anticipating the long lead time required to revive a production line for a 
complex system that has some parts which haven’t been manufactured in decades, planning was established to begin 
work immediately.  The RS-25 Production Restart Program focused on enabling the restart of manufacturing and 
production of RS-25 engines with emphasis on improving RS-25 system affordability and sustainability in order to 
provide extended service toward SLS mission needs.  The new engines will leverage innovations in low-cost 
manufacturing technologies, materials, and design practices acceptable for expendable engines.  
In addition to systemic efforts to reduce cost, the following changes are some of those being incorporated into the 
Restart design baseline: 
 Increased maximum thrust from 109% rated power level (RPL) to 111% RPL 
 Reduced service life to reflect engine expendability – the engine service life requirement will be reduced to 
enable nominal acceptance testing, mission operations and a moderate additional contingency. 
 Updated integrated loads with the SLS vehicle 
2.1 Phasing Integration of RS-25 Production Restart Development 
It was recognized that in order to pursue the objective of making the next generation of RS-25 engines a reality, it 
had to be conducted partially in parallel with the completion of adapting the heritage RS-25 engines for the initial 
SLS missions.  This required that additional attention be paid to phasing and coordination of programmatic and 
technical activities, as well as be responsive to unanticipated events and development challenges.  Figure 3 shows 
the overall layout of RS-25 contract phasing with respect to the Adaptation and Restart activities. 
 
Figure 3: RS-25 Block Development Phasing 
An interim activity was contracted with AR to prepare for the imminent Restart development activity by trading and 
evaluating candidate design initiatives with emphasis on reducing cost without sacrificing reliability or performance.  
The interim effort was contracted as an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) activity called contract line 
item number 5 (CLIN-5) appended to the AR contract.  Affordability candidates were assessed against the 
7TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE FOR AERONAUTICS AND SPACE SCIENCES (EUCASS) 
 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) involved in pursuing the design change, and their selection was based on 
budget, available time and level of risk.  In order to set a boundary for the limit of acceptable technical risk, the 
minimum TRL limit for candidates was set at 5 (i.e., component and/or breadboard demonstrated in a relevant 
environment).  Also, an exhaustive assessment was performed across the overall continuum involved in the RS-25 
life cycle using advanced process improvement tools and techniques such as Value Stream Mapping (VSM) and 
Kaizen exercises.  At the end of the CLIN-5 period of performance, all validated design candidates were carried 
forward into the Restart contract for further development. 
The RS-25 Production Restart Program commenced in October 2015 with a portfolio of validated design candidates 
to be pursued as part of establishing the Restart design baseline.  This being conducted in parallel with the final 
stages of the activity to establish the RS-25 Adaptation design baseline.  Also in parallel with the Restart activity, 
long-lead procurements are planned to be conducted for use on the new flight engines using the Restart design 
baseline. 
2.2 Control Boards & Milestone Reviews 
Following the selection of RS-25 design initiatives identified during the CLIN-5 activity, the continued management 
of Restart activities was performed under the auspices of the Affordability/Obsolescence Review Board (AORB).  
The AORB was established to review and disposition all Restart design initiatives and is responsible for monitoring 
the progress of each design activity to insure that the expected programmatic benefit in terms of cost reduction is 
realized.  The development path of each design initiative is laid out with key decision points and potential “off-
ramps” that can be triggered by the AORB if the affordability benefit is reduced or threatened.  An example of this 
occurred when an initiative to eliminate the expensive fuel flowmeter with an alternate flow-measuring approach 
could not provide sufficient accuracy to meet the required mixture ratio control precision.  As a result, after all 
reasonable options were examined, it was elected to off-ramp the flowmeter elimination initiative and return to the 
Adaptation flowmeter design until an acceptable flow-measuring approach was identified. 
A change management process was established to 1) ensure proper coordination and assessment of changes with all 
relevant stakeholder organizations (i.e., program management, engineering, safety & reliability), 2) disposition 
changes at the appropriate level, and 3) ensure change incorporation planning, verification closeout, and reporting.  
As they are completed, the design initiatives will be documented as part of a series of Engineering Change Proposals 
(ECPs) to modify the Adaptation baseline.  The ECPs will provide formal detailed documentation needed to 
establish the Restart baseline at the completion of the Restart DCR. 
Periodic milestone reviews are a useful tool for providing an independent review of development work in progress 
and also to demonstrate to other stakeholders that useful work is being effectively pursued and the risk portfolio is 
being successfully managed.  Like the milestone reviews executed for the Adaptation effort, the Restart activity took 
credit for the established operational record of the RS-25 and defined a set of milestone reviews to provide a 
composite assessment of work underway at particular points in the Restart development cycle.  These include: 
 Critical Design Summary Review (CDSR) – a milestone providing a system-level roll-up of all subsystem- 
and component-level design activities that have completed a detailed design level of maturity 
commensurate with a Critical Design Review (CDR).  The timing of the CDSR is planned to be at a point 
where most of the Restart design efforts will have completed their respective CDRs, and the CDSR is 
intended to insure that the aggregate system-level effects of the proposed design changes are adequately 
captured and understood.  The CDSR is also intended to assess alignment of the Restart development 
activity with programmatic imperatives of affordability and sustainability. 
 Certification Readiness Review (CRR) – a milestone preceding the initiation of system certification testing 
as a risk mitigation activity to assess readiness for design certification culminating in DCR.  The CRR will 
also examine the results of the prior development work and evaluate the maturity of the hardware design 
going into the certification test phase. 
 Design Certification Review (DCR) – a NASA-led milestone planned to be in compliance with a 
conventional DCR in order to formalize the establishment of the Restart design baseline when all 
verification and certification activity is completed. 
 Development Checkpoint (DCP) – a recurring annual event performed at the end of each fiscal year to 
provide a “year in review” synopsis and also review and assess readiness to continue work underway.  It 
has been shown to be an effective supplement to the Monthly Performance Reviews (MPRs) and provide a 
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useful extension to the information compiled for the CDSR.  Like the CDSR, the annual DCP provides 
customer insight to insure that design work performed at the component- or subsystem-level is accurately 
reflected at the system level. 
In addition, AR was responsible for internal reviews as needed (i.e., chief engineer reviews, technical interchange 
meetings, component- or subsystem-level design reviews) to assure effective NASA insight and oversight into all 
Restart activities. 
2.3 Affordability Enablers 
The results generated by the CLIN-5 studies showed that achieving the affordability goals for the Restart baseline 
will be enabled through the following key focus areas: 
 Hardware definition – this includes not only exploitation of modern fabrication techniques such as Additive 
Manufacturing (AM), but easing design and operational sensitivities imposed by reusability / supportability 
requirements.  This area can have the most tangible and easily measured savings in terms of per-unit cost. 
 Business practices – this is largely influenced on how AR operates in performing its business processes, but 
the cost savings of optimizing and evolving lean practices will also result in lower programmatic costs 
incurred by NASA. 
The key focus areas described above illuminate the fact that achieving the affordability goals for the Restart RS-25 
cannot be attained exclusively by selective redesign of the engine hardware.  It emphasizes a “deep dive” 
examination into all areas and organizations involved in producing the engine, starting with raw materials and 
vendor components arriving at the AR facility, and ending with engine delivery at the NASA Michoud Assembly 
Facility (MAF).  The work currently being undertaken in the Restart activity is guided by the following imperatives 
and objectives: 
Institutional 
 Challenge entrenched paradigms and “sacred cows”, allow freedom to innovate and adapt 
 Seek and prosecute inefficiencies 
 Encourage fresh perspectives, opinions, ideas 
 Establish guidance on risk tolerance (i.e., perfection is unnecessary when “good enough” is acceptable) 
 Seek new technologies for evaluation and exploitation 
 Leverage documented lessons-learned and nonconformances (e.g., Unsatisfactory Condition Reports 
(UCRs), Material Reviews (MRs)) to identify preemptive corrective actions that can be implemented in the 
design, processes, or operations 
 Establish a methodical approach to affordability with quantifiable tracking, including development of a 
business case for each change that trades development cost and risk against run-out cost savings 
 Grant credit for the long history of the RS-25 system (40+ years), AR experience, and NASA insight skills 
Technical 
 Increased minimum power level requirement to eliminate the need for an engine test stand equipped with a 
diffuser for throttle testing 
 Reduced gimbal angle requirement to enable the use of flex hoses instead of flex ducts – reduced hardware 
complexity reducing fabrication costs 
 Selected use of Additive Manufacturing (AM) technologies, including Selective Laser Melting (SLM), 
Near-Net Shape forgings 
 Leverage design and manufacturing experience and lessons-learned from recent J-2X engine development 
[3] (e.g., replace MCC plated liner with hot isostatic pressed (HIP) manufacture; AM valve housings). 
 Reduce sub-assembly parts and welds 
 Eliminate nonconformance drivers for manufacturing rejects and assembly reworks 
 Selective use of Manufacturing Technology Demonstrators (MTDs) to validate affordability approach 
 Eliminate unnecessary instrumentation and supporting bosses, sense lines and harnesses 
 Eliminate outdated inspection and maintenance operations 
 Eliminate or mitigate failure modes that drive maintenance-intensive hazard controls 
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 Push for reductions in touch labor and fabrication cycle times 
 Push for innovations in supplier selection and management 
 Incorporate lean manufacturing practices to optimize scheduling and factory flows for fabrication 
machinery/tooling 
While it can be said that the Institutional items listed above are largely philosophical common-sense mantras, it is 
important to note that they can and should be applicable to both AR and NASA.  Pursing technical perfection and 
affordability are not generally compatible and will rely on contractor and customer coordination to establish the 
necessary balance. 
2.4 System Testing 
In addition to selected component-level testing, two development engines will serve as platforms for initial system-
level tests of design changes managed by the AORB.  These tests will be conducted on a series of progressive 
“retrofit” configurations to allow performance characterization of each modified component and their interaction 
with the system to determine if further adjustments to the design change is needed.  The tests performed on the 
retrofit engines will also contribute toward certification of system service life by accumulating starts and run 
duration on selected components. 
After completion of the development test program on the retrofit engines, the CRR milestone review will be 
conducted as a gate to proceed into the system-level certification test series.  The certification tests will be 
performed on a RS-25 engine reflecting the expendable Restart design baseline. 
Spanning the period between the CRR and DCR milestones, the system test program is expected to take 4 years and 
includes 40 hotfire tests on the development engines, 12 tests on the certification engine, and 4 tests as contingency 
options. 
2.5 Over the Horizon – Block-IV RS-25 
While the CLIN-5 work was focused on identifying near-term upgrades to the RS-25 design to address affordability 
and obsolescence concerns, it was constrained against using low-TRL, higher-risk candidates.  Understanding that 
the NASA and the aerospace industry will promote the advancement of promising material and manufacturing 
technologies as their merits became more apparent and exploitable, a longer-term study is being performed to 
identify and assess the benefits of those design candidates that were not selected to be incorporated into the Restart 
design activity.  Referred to as the “Block-IV Upgrade” study, AR is working with NASA to conduct engineering 
studies to enable the development of a longer-term strategic plan to possibly pursue more aggressive affordability 
options for the RS-25 engine beyond the Restart configuration. 
3. Summary 
Evolving the RS-25 into the next generation design baseline will be challenging in order to accommodate the 
numerous programmatic and technical imperatives imposed by the SLS program.  Work completed to date by AR 
and the SLS Liquid Engines team shows good progress and rapid response to overcome both anticipated and 
unanticipated challenges.  The path ahead for making the RS-25 Restart Production a reality is focused on helping 
NASA open a new era of exploration and discovery by leveraging the best of this nation’s investment in space 
technology. 
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